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INTRODUCTION
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC,' the effort to
prohibit electoral advocacy by corporations had been central to campaign
finance reform, most recently in § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA).2 The legal foundation of this initiative was the Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,3 which
Citizens United overruled.4 The premise of Austin was that corporations distort
the public sphere when they spend general treasury funds on electoral
advocacy.
From the start, Austin stood awkwardly alongside the Court's other recent
precedents on corporate speech -namely, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Lifes
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.6 The Austin Court also had to
contend with one of the central dictates of Buckley v. Valeo': that equality is not
a permissible rationale for curtailing speech rights in the electoral sphere.
Whatever the wisdom of that pronouncement, Justice Marshall's attempt to
distinguish it in Austin was tortuous.8 When the Supreme Court ordered
reargument in Citizens United at the end of the 20o8 Term, it became clear that
Austin would not survive as precedent. 9
This Note does not ask whether Citizens United was rightly decided.
Rather, it takes the decision as a starting point to propose a new beginning for
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2olo).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 18 U.S.C. S 607, 36 U.S.C. 5 510, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315, and in scattered sections of2 U.S.C. (20o6)).
3. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
5. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
6. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An
Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (1991).
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
8. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 105, 109 (calling the Austin Court's rationale "simply a repackaging of the
equalization goal" that Buckley had rejected); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for
Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAUF. L.
REV. 1, 41 (1996); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1369 n.1 (1994) ("[T]he Court asserted that the [Michigan]
restriction was concerned with 'corruption' but defined 'corruption' in a way that made it
essentially equivalent to inequality.").





the regulation of corporate electoral advocacy -one that recognizes incognito
speech as the real source of problems. Corporations may contribute to public
discourse on issues of economic growth and job creation, but when they speak
without disclosing their identities, they not only misrepresent public support
for their positions'o-the danger on which Austin focused-but they also
breach duties to their shareholders and vitiate the informational value of their
speech. Instead of curtailing corporate speech rights in narrowly defined
domains of electoral advocacy, legislators who aim to reform campaign finance
should turn their attention to disclosure and disclaimer rules across a broader
range of corporate political speech. Such rules are not just second-best options
in the wake of Citizens United; there are reasons to believe that they might be
more effective than outright prohibitions of corporate speech in preventing
corruption (or the appearance of corruption) and informing the electorate.
Many disclosure and disclaimer provisions already cover the narrow
territory of electioneering communications and express candidate advocacy.
Even as Citizens United struck down BCRA S 203," 5 201's disclosure
requirement for electioneering communications and 31's disclaimer
provisions remain in effect,12 and most states provide their own disclosure and
disclaimer requirements." After Citizens United, the House of Representatives
passed the DISCLOSE Act, which would have applied additional disclosure
and disclaimer requirements to certain forms of corporate political spending. 4
But the bill died in the Senate," and even had it passed, its scope would have
been limited to electioneering communications and express candidate advocacy
or its functional equivalent.' 6 The Act would have broadened slightly the
definitions of those activities" but done nothing to address the wider array of
io. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2oio).
n1. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
12. Id. at 916. Only Justice Thomas voted in Citizens United to hold them unconstitutional. Id. at
980-82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Thirty-eight states currently require disclosure for all or some independent expenditures or
electioneering communications, regardless of whether the speaker is a corporation, see infra
notes 38, 44-46 and accompanying text, and thirty-two have laws requiring disclaimer in
such communications, see infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
14. H.R. 5175, ni1th Cong. (2010). The acronym stands for "Democracy Is Strengthened by
Casting Light on Spending in Elections." Id. § i(a).
15. 156 CONG. REc. S6285 (daily ed. July 27, 2010).
16. H.R. 5175 §§ 201-202, 211, 214 (applying new rules to independent expenditures or
electioneering communications).
17. Id. §§ 201-202.
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corporate political speech that neither "expressly advocat[es] the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate"' nor "refers to a clearly identified
candidate"" in such a way as to be "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against" that candidate.2 o Provisions of
that limited scope do not adequately serve the public interest in an informed
electorate.
This Note, which proceeds in three Parts, proposes that legislators consider
a more sweeping regime of disclosure and disclaimer for corporate-funded
speech. Part I describes disclosure and disclaimer laws currently in place at
both the federal and state levels. Part II seeks to justify broad disclosure and
disclaimer laws. It argues that such laws further two critical objectives of
campaign finance reform: informing the electorate and preventing corruption
(or the appearance of corruption). Part III defends the constitutional validity of
broader disclosure and disclaimer requirements for corporate speakers in the
electoral sphere.
I. CURRENT DISCLOSURE AND DISCLAIMER LAWS
It is helpful to begin with taxonomies -both of speech that may be subject
to disclosure and disclaimer requirements and of the requirements
themselves.2' Two relevant categories of speech are independent expenditures
and electioneering communications." The former label generally applies to
speech that "expressly advocates" for or against a "clearly identified"
candidate." (Some provisions apply to advocacy for and against ballot
measures as well as candidates.)
18. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 211, 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (206).
ig. Id. § 201, 2 U.S.C. 5 4 34 (f)( 3)(A)(i)(II).
20. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
21. Because these broad categories apply to both state and federal statutes, the following
paragraphs discuss them interchangeably.
22. This Note considers laws applicable to all persons (or, in a few cases, only to corporations),
rather than laws pertaining only to political committees, such as 2 U.S.C. § 434(a).
23. See infra Subsection III.A.i for an explanation of how this formula arose from Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam). The DISCLOSE Act would have expanded the
definition of independent expenditures to cover any communication
that, when taken as a whole, expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, or is the functional equivalent of express advocacy because it
can be interpreted by a reasonable person only as advocating the election or defeat




Arkansas law offers a typical definition of independent expenditures:
An "independent expenditure" is any expenditure which is not a
contribution and:
(A) Expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for office;
(B) Is made without arrangement, cooperation, or consultation
between any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of the
candidate and the person making the expenditure or any authorized
agent of that person; and
(C) Is not made in concert with or at the request or suggestion of
any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of the candidate. 4
An "electioneering communication" is speech that references a candidate
within a specified time prior to an election. The first criterion, in theory,
sweeps more broadly than that of independent expenditures: whereas
independent expenditures must expressly advocate for or against a candidate,
electioneering communications need only refer to the candidate." But
Wisconsin Right to Life more or less eviscerated this distinction by construing
the term "refer" to cover only communications "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.",,6 The time criterion cuts more narrowly: the "electioneering
communications" label applies only within a specified period prior to an
election." Jurisdictions may also apply a targeting criterion, regulating
messages as electioneering communications only when they reach a given
population.
Federal law defines an electioneering communication as "any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication" that meets three standards.'8 It must "refer[]
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and, after Wisconsin Right
to Life, must be "susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
mentions a candidacy, a political party, or a challenger to a candidate, or takes a
position on a candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office.
H.R. 5175, iith Cong. § 201(a) (2010). Still, this definition is fundamentally limited to
direct candidate advocacy.
24. ARK. CODEANN. § 7-6-201(11) (Supp. 2009).
25. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f(3)(A)(i)(I).
26. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
27. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. 5 434(f(3)(A)(i)(II).
28. Id. § 4 34 (f(3) (A) (i).
29. Id. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I).
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appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 3 o It must occur "within ...
6o days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the
candidate; or . . . 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a
convention or caucus."31 And in a congressional race, it must be capable of
being "received by 5o,ooo or more persons"3 in the relevant jurisdiction.
A second taxonomy is of the regulations themselves. Disclosure regulations
require speakers to file with the government a public accounting of the money
they have spent to support a given candidate.3 ' Disclosure permits any
interested party to discover the source of candidates' support. Disclaimer
regulations, by contrast, require that speakers identify themselves in their
communications rather than merely in filings with an agency. Disclaimers
convey less information than disclosures - a few seconds in a television spot,
rather than a detailed form -but they are more vivid and accessible. Disclosure
and disclaimer regulations are complements in a thorough regime of
transparency for campaign finance.
A. What Expenditures Must Be Disclosed?
Federal law requires disclosure by "[e]very person . . . who makes
independent expenditures . . . in excess of $250 during a calendar year,"" as
well as disclosure of "disbursement[s] for the direct costs of producing and
airing electioneering communications in . . . excess of $10,000 during any
calendar year."" The DISCLOSE Act would have required immediate
disclosure of independent expenditures in excess of $1o,ooo by any person,"6
and it would have imposed additional requirements for the disclosure of
30. 551 U.S. at 470. Wisconsin Right to Life presented an as-applied challenge to the corporate
spending regulation of BCRA § 203, not the disclosure requirement of 5 201. Because both
sections draw on the definition of electioneering communications in 2 o, the Court's
construction presumably governs § 201 as well as § 203.
31. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (f)(3)(A)(i)(II). Again, the DISCLOSE Act would have expanded the
preelection window to 120 days for a general election. H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 202(a)
(2010).
32. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C).
33. For an insightful discussion of disclosure requirements and how they might work better, see
Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273 (2010).
34. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c).
35. Il. § 4 34 (f)(1).




independent expenditures and electioneering communications by
corporations."
In the states, independent expenditures commonly trigger disclosure
requirements. Thirty-four states require disclosure of independent
expenditures. They generally hew to the definition of independent
expenditures outlined above, though some do not make explicit the
requirement that advocacy be "express,"" and others do not mandate that the
candidate in question be "clearly identified."4 o A few definitions do not use the
37. Id. 5 211.
38. They include Alaska, ALASKA STAT. 5 15.13.135 (LEXIS through 2010 Sess.); Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. 5 7-6-220 (2007); California, CAL. Gov'T CODE 5 85500 (West 2005); Colorado,
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, 5 s; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 9-612(e)(1) (LEXIS
through 2010 Supp.); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8031(a) (2007); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. 5 106.071(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2010 Sess.); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN.
5 67-6611 (2010); Illinois, 1o ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/9-8.6 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2010 Sess.); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.404( 3 ) (West Supp. 2010); Kansas, KAN. STAT.
ANN. 5 25-4150 (2009); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 121.150 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1501.1 (Supp. 2010), construed in Ctr. for Individual
Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3 d 655 (5th Cir. 2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A,
§ io19 -B (Supp. 2009); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. ss, § 18A (West Supp.
2010); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 169.251 (West 2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 1oA.2o (West Supp. 2010); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-809 (2007);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.047 (West 2010); Montana, MONT. ADMIN. R. 44.10.531
(Westlaw through 2010); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1467 (Supp. 2008); Nevada,
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294A.210 (LexisNexis 2008); New Jersey, N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 19:25-12.8 (2010); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12 (2009); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3517 .1o5(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2005); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26o.o44
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Spec. Sess.); Pennsylvania, 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3246(g) (West 2010); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-25-10(b) (Supp. 2009); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-16 (Supp. 2010); Texas, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 253.062 (West 2010), construed in Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W. 3d 31, 43 (Tex. 2000)
("Though complexly phrased and structured, the Election Code has an unambiguous
intended effect: an individual must report direct expenditures that total over $1oo . . . .");
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-945.2 (Supp. 2009); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.17.100 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-8-2(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Extraordinary Sess.); and Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. 5 n.06(2) (West Supp. 2009).
39. These include Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §169.251; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.
5 49-1467; North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12; Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.1o5(B)(2); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 260.044; and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 5 42.17.100.
40. These include Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN § 1o6.071(1); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.
§ 169.251; and Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1467.
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term "advocacy" at all.41 Of the thirty-four states that require disclosure for
independent expenditures, ten also require disclosure for electioneering
communications.4 ' North Carolina requires disclosure for a third category of
speech, which it dubs "candidate-specific communications." Arizona"' and
Utah45 impose disclosure requirements specific to corporate independent
expenditures. And Hawaii and Vermont require disclosure for electioneering
communications but not independent expenditures.4*
Under this regime, a great deal of electoral advocacy carries no disclosure
requirement. At the federal level, disclosure is required only for express
advocacy,47 except during the brief preelection window-sixty days for a
general election, thirty days for a primary48 -when it is required for speech
"susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for
or against a specific candidate."" The DISCLOSE Act would have expanded
this regime, requiring more rapid disclosure of certain independent
expenditures"o and additional disclosure for independent expenditures and
electioneering communications by corporations." But even these mandates
41. See ALASKA STAT. § 15-13-135; id. 5 15.13.400(10); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-612(e)(1); id.
5 9-601(18); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §5 18:1483, :i5oi.1, construed in Ctr. for Individual Freedom,
449 F.3d at 665 ("We . . . conclude that the statute reaches only communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
5 130.047; N.J. ADMIN. CODE §19:25-12.7; TEX. ELEc. CODE ANN. § 251.001.
42. These include California, CAL. GOV'T CODE 5 85310; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 5 1-45-
1o8(1)(a)(III) (LEXIS through 2010 Sess.); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 1o6.071(1); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 67-6630; Illinois, 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.15, -8.6; Massachusetts,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 5 5 18F; North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.81; Ohio,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 35 17 .10n(D) (LexisNexis SUpp. 2010); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 12-27-16; and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. 5 3-8-2b (LexisNexis
2009).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 163-278.101.
44. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-914.02 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. 2010).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 2oA-11- 701 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). Utah will, as of January 1, 2011,
also impose a general disclosure requirement for electioneering communications. 2010 Utah
Laws ch. 389.
46. 2010 Haw. Legis. Serv. 211 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2893 (Supp. 2009).
47. 2 U.S.C. §5 431(17), 434(c) (20o6).
48. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,470 (2007); see 2 U.S.C. 5 4 3 4 (f)( 3)(A)(i)(II).
49. 2 U.S.C. 5 4 34 (f) (3) (A)(i) (I).
so. H.R. 5175, 11ith Cong. 5 203 (2010).




would have taken effect only within the realm of direct candidate advocacy.s2
The state requirements, too, extend only to speech that advocates for or against
a particular candidate."
B. What Communications Must Carry Disclaimers?
Federal law requires disclaimers for both electioneering communications
and communications funded by independent expenditures.54 The DISCLOSE
Act would have required more robust disclaimer statements but would not
have expanded the scope of coverage." Among the states, Illinois,, 6 South
Dakota," and West Virginia"' require disclaimers both for express advocacy
and for electioneering communications. Louisiana" and Vermont6 o require
disclaimers only for electioneering communications, while twelve states require
52. See id. § 201 (slightly broadening the definition of independent expenditures to include
speech "that, when taken as a whole, expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, or is the functional equivalent of express advocacy because it can be
interpreted by a reasonable person only as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate,
taking into account whether the communication involved mentions a candidacy, a political
party, or a challenger to a candidate, or takes a position on a candidate's character,
qualifications, or fitness for office"); id. § 202 (slightly broadening the definition of
electioneering communications to include speech within 120 days of a general election); id.
§ 211 (applying new rules for corporate disclosures to "campaign-related activity"); id. § 212
(defining "campaign-related activity" to cover independent expenditures and electioneering
communications).
53. See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text. A few states' requirements do purport to
cover a broader range of speech. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. But because
Buckley narrowed the construction of "expenditure" in the Federal Election Campaign Act
"to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate," holding that a broader construction would render the
statute unconstitutionally vague, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam)
(footnote omitted), this limitation should apply to any broader state definition. The Florida
Supreme Court, for instance, narrowed the construction of "independent expenditure with
respect to any candidate or issue," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1o6.071(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2010 Sess.), so as "to reach only those funds used for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or referendum
issue." Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 933 (Fla. 1998) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8o).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a). For details of the required disclosures, see id. § 441d(c), (d)(2).
5s. H.R. 5175 §214 .
S6. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.15, -9.5 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2010 Sess).
57. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-16 (Supp. 2010).
58. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-8-2(e), -2b (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Extraordinary Sess.).
59. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(C)(2) (Supp. 2010).
6o. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2892 (Supp. 2009).
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disclaimers only for express advocacy.1 An additional nine states require
disclaimers for all independent advocacy regardless of whether the advocacy is
"express.62 Five states purport to impose a much broader disclaimer
requirement, covering even nonadvocacy communications. Washington
applies a hybrid scheme, requiring basic disclaimers for all "political
advertising" but imposing more detailed requirements for independent
expenditures (advocacy) or electioneering communications. And Arizona
applies a disclaimer requirement only to corporate independent expenditures."
Like the disclosure provisions discussed earlier, these regulations leave
much electoral advocacy untouched. Five states mandate disclaimers for the
66broad category of political advertising. But in the vast majority of states, and
at the federal level, electoral communications that stay outside the bounds of
direct advocacy or the narrow strictures of electioneering communications
carry no disclaimer requirement at all.
61. These include California, CAL. GoV'T CODE § 84506 (West 2005); Colorado, COLO. CONST.
art. XXVIII, 5 5, cl. 2; Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. Is, 5 8023(a) (2007); Kansas, KAN.
STAT.ANN. § 25-415 6(B) (2009); Idaho, IDAHO CODEANN. §6 7 -6614 A (2010); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-9-3-2.5 (LexisNexis 2002); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. 5 68A.4o4( 5), .405 (West
Supp. 2010); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.190 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009);
Pennsylvania, 25 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. 5 3258(a) (West 2oo); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
5 2oA-11-901 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. 5 24.2-956.1, -957.3,
-958.3, -959.1 (20o6); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 11.30 (West 2004). The Wisconsin
statute was held unconstitutional as applied in Swaffer v. Cane, 61o F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D.
Wis. 2009).
62. These include Alaska, ALASKA STAT. 5 15-13-1 35(b) (2008); Hawaii, 201o Haw. Legis. Serv.
211 (West 2010); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., ELEc. LAw 513-401 (LexisNexis 2002);
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. 5 13-35-225 (2009); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 664:14 (LexisNexis 2007); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 19:44A-22.3 (West Supp. 2010);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-278.39 (2009); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
53517.1o5(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2oo5); and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §8-13-1354 (Supp.
2009).
63. Alabama's disclaimer requirement applies to "[a]ny paid political advertisement." ALA.
CODE § 17-5-12 (LexisNexis 2007). Florida's does the same. FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 106.143
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2010 Sess.). Michigan law uses even broader terms, requiring
disclaimers for any "billboard, placard, poster, pamphlet, or other printed matter," or "radio
or television paid advertisement[,] having reference to an election, a candidate, or a ballot
question." MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 169.247 (West 2009). Nebraska similarly requires
disclaimers for communications "relating to a candidate or ballot question," NEB. REV. STAT.
5 49-1474.01 (2004), and Missouri requires them for communications "relative to any
candidate for public office or any ballot measure," Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.031(8) (West
2010).
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 42.17-510 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
65. Anuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16- 9 14 .o2(F) (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. 2010).




II. MOTIVATIONS FOR BROADER DISCLOSURE AND DISCLAIMER
LAWS
This Part argues for broader disclosure and disclaimer of corporate electoral
communications, extending to speech beyond direct advocacy. A weak version
of this argument would be that broad disclosure and disclaimer requirements
are better than nothing-that they are second-best options now that the
government can no longer ban corporations from speaking in particular
circumstances.6 7 But I press a stronger claim: that disclosure and disclaimer
requirements might actually do better than outright prohibition in achieving
the informational and anticorruption objectives that have long been central to
reform efforts."
A few caveats are in order. First, this argument does not endorse the
unleashing of corporate electoral speech absent provisions for disclosure and
disclaimer. Whether corporations will in fact use their new rights under
Citizens United to flood the airwaves with political speech remains unclear,"
67. This sort of argument has predominated among reform-minded scholars in the immediate
wake of Citizens United. See, e.g., Corporate America vs. The Voter: Examining the Supreme
Court's Decision To Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in Elections: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Rules & Admin., niith Cong. (2010) (statement of Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly
Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School), available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File id=46b2oc68-8e8b-44ba-a2o6-32703e28oa4e [hereinafter
Gerken Statement]; The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform After Citizens United:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11, 26 (2010) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M.
Loeb University Professor and Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School)
[hereinafter Tribe Statement]; Lloyd H. Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure: Reward and Risk,
45 IND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2 & nn.6-8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=1622760; Eric Lichtblau, Democrats Pushing To Require
Campaign Disclosure of Corporate Roles in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 2010, at Ai6;
Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
24, 2010, 10:30 PM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2oio/oi/what-should-congress-do-about
-citizens-united/.
68. My argument differs from that of reform opponents, some of whom view disclosure and
disclaimer begrudgingly as better options than prohibition or content regulation, but who
generally do not believe that our government should manage the marketplace of electoral
speech. One of the most prominent opponents of reform, Bradley Smith, has written that
"disclosure laws raise serious First Amendment questions." Bradley A. Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049,
1071 n.139 (1996). At least one notable opponent of reform, Kathleen Sullivan, has endorsed
disclosure. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REv.
311, 326-27.
69. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, Political Ads Are Tough Sell for Image-Conscious Corporations,
WASH. POST, June 1, 2olo, at A3.
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but the prospect that they might do so without identifying themselves or their
interests is troubling.7o Second, the argument takes account only of the
interests that the Supreme Court has deemed constitutionally legitimate in this
field, which notably do not include equality. Among Buckley's central dictates is
that the government may not constitutionally "restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others."71 One
can argue that Buckley was wrongly decided in this regard-- that democracy
commands equal voices just as it commands equal votes. But that is not the
law. I therefore argue that disclaimer and disclosure help to foster the
permissible objectives of reform, not that they are panaceas for an inequitable
system.
A. Distortion and the Marketplace ofIdeas
In considering Michigan's law against corporate expenditures on electoral
advocacy, the Austin Court had to contend with Buckley's holding that equality
is not a permissible reason to regulate electoral speech.7 ' Adhering to this
precedent, the Austin majority framed its decision to uphold the Michigan law
as a vindication of Buckley's anticorruption rationale. Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, argued that Michigan had restricted corporate speech to combat
"a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas."7 3 Although some see the
Court's rationale as "simply a repackaging of the equalization goal" that Buckley
had rejected," the antidistortion formula at least claims to address a different
value: the integrity of the public sphere. Under the Austin Court's theory, the
public support that an idea commands should dictate its effect on the public
sphere; an idea without public support should not shape public discourse."
70. Some recent evidence does suggest that large corporations have embraced the opportunity
for incognito political advocacy. See Eric Lipton, Mike McIntyre & Don Van Natta, Jr., Large
Donations Aid U.S. Chamber in Election Drive, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 20io, at Ai.
71. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
72. Id.
73. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
74. Eule, supra note 8, at 109.
75. In that case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's ability to place the ad had nothing to do




Under the Austin Court's framing, speech by for-profit corporations is
different from speech by individuals or by the kind of ideological nonprofit
identified in Massachusetts Citizens for Life' 6 (MCFL), because for-profit
corporations build their "immense aggregations of wealth" through "the
corporate form."77 Whereas speech by an MCFL group reflects the support of
its members, and speech by a wealthy individual reflects at least the
individual's own political autonomy, corporate speech reflects only the license
of a charter to maximize profits.
Embedded in this argument is an important assumption: that the ex ante
level of public support is what qualifies speech as legitimate. In the Austin
Court's conception, the public sphere is a static receptacle of ideas. Rather than
considering how ideas accrue support after their introduction to public
discourse, Austin seems to envision that the legitimating marketplace of
political ideas precedes the public airing of those ideas. A speaker distorts the
public sphere, in this view, by introducing ideas that have not already won
support. In practice, the proving ground is financial. What makes the speech of
an MCFL organization legitimate, in the Austin Court's eyes, is that the
ideological nonprofit has already raised funds from people who believe in what
it has to say. Funding by for-profit corporations confers no such legitimacy.
But public support for a given idea is not, as the Austin Court seems to have
imagined, isolated from interchange within the public sphere. The effect of an
idea on public discourse is proportional not to the preliminary level of support
for that idea but to its eventual support-to the extent to which it sways
opinions. No matter how loudly an idea is expressed, and no matter its initial
popularity, it lives or dies according to how many people ultimately believe it.
If corporate-funded expression convinces no one, then it distorts nothing.
A better way to conceive of distortion is this: speech distorts the public
sphere if its effect on public discourse surpasses its true level of public support,
which is to say the support that it would command after full, fair, and rational
evaluation by the public.' In a realm of imperfect information, the public
76. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). MCFL held that certain nonprofit corporations could not
constitutionally be bound by the bar on corporate independent expenditures under 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (2006). The Court exempted from the bar corporations that were "formed for the
express purpose of promoting political ideas" rather than to "engage in business activities,"
that "ha[d] no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on [their] assets
or earnings," that were not "established by a business corporation or a labor union," and
that did not "accept contributions from such entities." Id. at 264.
77. Austin, 494 U.S. at 66o.
78. Scholars have described this ideal capacity for civic thought as "voter competence." See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 1011 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett &
Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4
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cannot always evaluate ideas rationally. 9 When the public's knowledge is
limited, an idea may command more support and thus greater influence than it
would in a realm of perfect information. The purpose of disclosure and
disclaimer provisions is to facilitate the full and fair consideration of electoral
advocacy after its entry into public discourse. If, as Justice Holmes wrote, "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market,"o then disclosure and disclaimer help the market to
function.
The importance of complete information in the public sphere is central to
Alexander Meiklejohn's theory of the First Amendment, which has profoundly
influenced First Amendment jurisprudence.' The purpose of the First
Amendment, Meildejohn writes, "is to give to every voting member of the body
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems
with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.""' To ensure
"that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear
upon our common life," the First Amendment provides that "no idea, no
opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be
kept from them.""
The proposition that disclosure and disclaimer help to inform the electorate
is not uncontroversial. The most cogent critique of this idea is that limited and
superficial forms of information add little to the deliberative quality of public
discourse. In his influential treatment of democracy and the First Amendment,
Ronald Dworkin writes of "the degradation of our public discourse by moronic
political commercials that make no arguments beyond repetitive slogans and
ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005) ("Voters are competent 'if they cast the same votes they
would have cast had they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences
of their decision."' (quoting Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct
Legislation Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (S.L.
Elkin & K.E. Soltan eds., 1999))); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy:
Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," So UCLA L. REv.
1141 (2003).
79. For a detailed treatment of voter rationality, see James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the
Rationality ofElectoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
892 (1984).
8o. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Market: The Supreme Court and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. &
POL. 489, 498-501 (2001).
82. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88
(Lawbook Exchange 2000) (19 4 8).
83. Id. at 88-89.
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jingles."8' Dworkin observes that a system of "[c]onditional public funding,"
under which candidates would agree to air not "ordinary campaign
commercials" but only "longer, more substantive political broadcasts," could
"help to arrest that damage."" Under Dworkin's understanding, anonymity is
the least of the problems with the bulk of political communications in the
United States, and requiring political ads to include the speaker's name will do
little to improve their informational value.
But social science literature suggests that even "sound-bite[s] ,,86 to use
Dworkin's pejorative term, may have an important informational role as
heuristics. Voters most commonly "refer[] to the heuristic cue of party
identification to figure out which candidate is most likely to match [their]
values and share [their] interests."51 Most voters lack the time or inclination to
"consider[] all relevant information about the candidates," but they "leverage
their knowledge about the major political parties as an organizing heuristic for
understanding who the candidates are, whether the candidates are credible,
and which candidate best represents them."" Interest group affiliations can
serve a similar function."' Notwithstanding any idealized vision of deliberative
discourse, voters do weigh identity heuristics in determining their preferences.
Knowing that a given corporation supports or opposes a candidate can mean a
great deal.9o
84. RONALD DwoRKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 367
(2000).
85. Id. at 355-56, 367.
86. Id. at 356.
87. Kang, supra note 78, at 115o; see David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in
City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 454 (2007); Heather
Gerken, The Mismatch Problem: Why Election Law Isn't Always Built for the Electorate,
JOTWELL (Jan. 25, 201o), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/the-mismatch-problem-why-election
-law-isnt-always-built-for-the-electorate/.
88. Kang, supra note 78, at 1150.
8g. See id. Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith, in a study of ballot initiatives and referenda, cite
empirical work showing "that the position of an economic group with known preferences on
an issue can serve as an effective shortcut for ordinary voters, substituting for encyclopedic
information about the electoral choice." Garrett & Smith, supra note 78, at 298 (citing
Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California
Insurance Reform Elections, 88 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 63, 72 (1994)).
go. It is possible that voters, never having been exposed to corporate communications of the
nature that Citizens United permits, might not initially know whether endorsement by a
given corporation should increase or decrease their support for a candidate. This is true just
as for party labels: when a new party forms, voters may not know right away whether to
support that party's candidates. Voters learn these associations over time. If candidates
endorsed by Nike tend to act in a way that a given voter likes, that voter will be more likely
637
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Whether it should is open for debate. Daniel Ortiz writes that "Dworkin's
complaint . . . is, at bottom, a complaint about the way many of us evaluate
political candidates. Many of us, he thinks, simply do not exercise political
choice in the informed, deliberate, reasoned way he believes democracy
requires."' Ortiz coins the term "civic slackers" to refer to this set of
participants in democracy," and he frames reform proposals like Dworkin's as
efforts to save civic slackers from themselves-to shield them from "certain
political stimuli," like sound-bite advertising, that are likely to provoke them to
act in an irrational or incompetent way. But he rightly points out that such
reform "disrespects these voters' evaluative autonomy" by "frustrat[ing] their
ability to judge candidates in the way they would otherwise judge."9' Even if
reformers disrespect the way in which many voters evaluate candidates, that
disapprobation cannot stand in the way of policy responses to the epidemic of
civic disinterest. As long as civic slackers exist, any information that brings
them closer to the ideal of competence benefits our democracy.
If disclosure and disclaimer help foster a well-informed public sphere, the
question remains whether they do so better than a prohibition on corporate
electoral advocacy. There are at least two reasons why they might - one having
to do with the positive informational value of corporate speech and the other
concerning the myth that prohibiting corporate expenditures on electoral
advocacy can meaningfully insulate politics from corporate influence.
The majority opinion in Citizens United confronts the idea that corporate
speech is less valuable to public discourse than is individual speech. It refers to
the prohibition of corporate spending on electoral advocacy as "censorship ...
vast in its reach" and casts corporations as protectors of the people. "By
suppressing the speech of manifold corporations," the Court writes, "the
Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and
advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.", 6
This paean to corporate speech is excessive in its faith that profit-seeking
to support Nike's candidates in the future. (I owe this idea, like many others, to a
conversation with Brian Soucek.)
91. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 5o STAN. L. REV. 893,
905 (1998).
92. Id. at 903.
93. Id. at 905.
94. Id.





entities will speak for the common good.97 But corporate self-interest does to
some degree align with the general welfare; successful private enterprise
generates jobs and national income. Even Justice Stevens's vigorous dissent in
Citizens United observes that corporations "make enormous contributions to
our society.", 8 So corporate voices can be informative, even when they reflect
only profit motives."
Illustrative in this regard is the advocacy at issue in Austin: a proposed
advertisement by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce in support of Richard
Bandstra's candidacy for the state legislature. The Court noted the Chamber's
efforts "to place in a local newspaper an advertisement supporting a specific
candidate,"o'o without detailing the content of the proposed ad. But the
message itself, printed in an appendix to Justice Kennedy's dissent,"o' is no
picture of corporate cabalism. The Chamber of Commerce not only disclosed
its corporate interests but explained, in seven paragraphs of reasoned prose,
why its proposals (in Mr. Bandstra's hands) would benefit all Michiganders by
"making Michigan more competitive for business investment and job
creation.""o2 It stated outright that its proposals would reduce worker's
compensation.o 3 A Michigan voter could read this ad and agree or disagree
with its conclusion but could hardly be fooled by its premises.
To take the Bandstra ad as representative of corporate political speech
would be naive. Most of the political communications that fill airwaves in the
days before an election are less elaborately informative, less measured, and less
honest than the one proposed by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.0 4 The
97. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory ofFree Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998).
98. 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Corporate voices can be more informative when they represent motives beyond profit-
namely, when they represent groups of individuals who choose the corporate form to join in
support of public causes. As Justice Scalia wrote in McConnell v. FEC, "with increasing
frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular
ideas -such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association . . . ."
540 U.S. 93, 258 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
oo. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
1o1. Id. at 714 app. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. see, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How ATTACK ADS
SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995).
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important question is not whether something like the Bandstra ad helps to
inform the public but whether its cruder cousins do as well.
I submit that even crude ads do play some role in informing the public. As
noted earlier, the affiliation of a candidate with particular interest groups -just
like the candidate's party affiliation-can be a powerful heuristic for voters."o'
The very fact that the Chamber of Commerce endorses Richard Bandstra
means something to voters, regardless of what the Chamber says about him.
The same goes for even the least reasoned forms of political communication, as
long as they carry the name of the corporation for which they speak. Scholars
may condemn such ads for impoverishing public discourse, but time-starved
voters really do inform themselves by such basic cues as which corporation
stands behind which candidate.o 6
A second reason why disclosure and disclaimer might inform the public
sphere better than would a prohibition on corporate electoral advocacy is that
the latter provides a deceptive sense of insulation from corporate influence."o'
Before Citizens United, corporations could speak through political action
committees funded by contributions from their shareholders and employees.
They could fund electoral speech beyond the narrow categories of express
advocacy or electioneering communications. And they could influence political
actors in nonpublic ways. As Citizens United observes, "lobbying and corporate
communications [between corporations and] elected officials occur on a
regular basis.",,os Officials may wield "authority, influence, and power to
threaten corporations to support the Government's policies."' 9 But
corporations may pressure officials in much the same way, and a ban on their
doing so overtly can hardly stop them from applying pressure; it only drives
their actions away from the public eye. Hence one of the potential benefits of a
more open regime: when corporations contribute to public discourse through
mass advertising, rather than back-channel influence, "all can judge" the
"content and purpose" of their speech."o Corporations may maintain covert
influence even as they engage in public advocacy, but to the extent that their
public priorities align with those they communicate in private, the electorate
105. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the hydraulic problem in regulating influence over politics-that
"political money, like water, has to go somewhere"-see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999).






will at least glimpse what its representatives are seeing behind closed doors. In
short, proponents of an open political discourse should want to channel
corporate influence into public communications that can inform the electorate.
B. Preventing Corruption
Disclosure and disclaimer may also be more effective than a ban on
corporate electoral advocacy in the battle against corruption-which has, since
Buckley, been the lodestar of the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence."'
In concluding that "[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption,"". the
Citizens United majority broke with a line of cases that had envisioned a
broader reach for the anticorruption rationale."' For the Buckley Court, "the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities
for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions" was
"[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements."" In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,' the Court
explained that Buckley had "recognized a concern not confined to bribery of
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.""' It warned that if "the
perception of impropriety" were to go "unanswered,... the cynical assumption
that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take
part in democratic governance."" 7 Heather Gerken writes that Citizens United
effectively overrules these holdings and that having done so may prove its
greatest impact."' But even quid pro quo corruption need not "take the form of
outright vote buying or bribes"; it includes "the myriad ways in which outside
parties may induce an officeholder to confer a legislative benefit in direct
ini. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam) ("It is unnecessary to look beyond
the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions -in order to find a constitutionally sufficient
justification for the [Federal Election Campaign Act's] $1,000 contribution limitation.").
112. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 91o.
113. Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Heather K. Gerken,
The Real Problem with Citizens United, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the-real-problem-with citizens united.
114. 4 24 U.S. at 27.
11S. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
11. Id. at 389.
117. Id. at 390.
118. See Gerken, supra note 113.
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response to, or anticipation of, some outlay of money the parties have made or
will make on behalf of the officeholder." 9
As political scientist Donald Green wrote in an expert report submitted as
evidence to the district court in McConnell v. FEC, scholars have identified
three "conditions that give rise to corruption," including "(i) large payoffs to
those involved, (2) small probabilities of detection and punishment, and (3)
enduring relationships between donors and politicians so that informal deals
can be monitored and enforced."1o The most relevant of these conditions, for
our purposes, is the second: the probability that anyone who expends or
contributes money on behalf of a candidate will be held to account.
Disclosure and disclaimer regulations increase this probability, whereas an
outright prohibition on certain forms of corporate electoral advocacy might
decrease the probability that voters perceive dealings between corporate and
political interests. The reason is that corporations seek to influence politics and
politicians even when they cannot spend treasury funds on certain forms of
advocacy.'2 1 Consider what sort of corporate conduct the pre-Citizens United
regime fostered. If a defense contractor wanted to support a pro-defense
candidate, it could not (in the sixty days prior to the general election) run an ad
encouraging voters to elect that candidate. But it could run an ad designed to
increase the salience of national security issues in voters' minds, subtly
encouraging them to favor the preferred candidate, without ever mentioning
the candidate's name. The candidate would undoubtedly be grateful for both
ads, even if he or she might prefer the more explicit advocacy of the first to the
indirection of the second."' But the first is more susceptible to "detection and
punishment" by the electorate. Legislators concerned with preventing quid pro
quo corruption should not want to discourage corporations from tying
themselves explicitly to the names of particular candidates, parties, or causes.
Disclosure and disclaimer can also ameliorate the broader form of
corruption that the Court no longer recognizes as a constitutionally legitimate
basis for regulation. Much of the negative commentary in the wake of Citizens
United argued that the Court's decision "thrust politics back to the robber-
a1g. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 964 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
120. Report on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act at 28, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. o2-CV-582), 2000 WL 34863981 (citing HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 1062 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974)). McConnell, as ultimately decided by the
Supreme Court, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), upheld most provisions of BCRA as constitutional.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 105-109.
122. This is by no means a foregone conclusion. Plenty of candidates might not want to be
associated directly with corporate interests in the minds of voters.
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baron era of the 19th century," enabling "corporations to use their vast
treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate elected officials into doing
their bidding."' These concerns reflect not so much a specific fear of quid pro
quo corruption as a general anxiety that corporate speech will drown out the
voice of the people. That anxiety makes sense; the vigor of our democracy
depends on the belief that individual citizens can make their voices heard.
But prohibiting corporate electoral advocacy may not be the most effective
way to address the anxiety, because that solution focuses only on the visible
portion of the sphere of political influence, to the exclusion of a broader range
of less visible contacts between politicians and corporate interests.
Corporations and corporate executives have constant opportunities for
"[ii ngratiation and access'"" in American politics. Such opportunities may
result from social or professional relationships," from regulators' genuine
need for information about regulated industries, from campaign fundraising,
or from sub rosa promises or threats. When corporations gain access to
political actors through any of these mechanisms, they apply their influence in
a direct way; the voters are mere bystanders.
When corporations seek to influence politics through public advocacy, by
contrast, the voters mediate such influence. Citizens United observes:
The fact that a corporation . . . is willing to spend money to try to
persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence
over elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the
electorate will refuse "to take part in democratic governance" because of
additional political speech made by a corporation or any other
speaker."'
The Court overstates the latter proposition. Voters may ignore the corporate
speech that reaches them, or they may turn out to vote even as they lament
corporate participation in politics-but they may also participate in smaller
numbers, having lost faith in the system. What matters, though, is that the
influence of corporate electoral advocacy on politics is proportional to its ability
123. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court's Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30.
124. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (majority opinion).
125. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 185-88 (2010) (discussing the many relationships between
Bush and Obama Administration economic officials and their former colleagues on Wall
Street, and the access that these relationships produced).
126. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003)).
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to persuade voters. If corporate speech alienates the very voters that it hopes to
persuade, causing them to bow out of civic participation, then the speech may
be useless to political actors. Voters may even punish corporate-endorsed
politicians for their ties to special interests. Whereas a ban on electoral
advocacy steers corporations toward modes of political engagement that
sideline voters, disclosure and disclaimer rules induce them to engage with
voters.
Given the unavoidable force of corporate interests in political life, therefore,
legislators who hope to reform campaign finance can more effectively prevent
corruption (both broadly and narrowly conceived) by channeling corporate
influence into public forms of engagement with the electorate than by forcing
the influence into smoke-filled rooms.
III.THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF BROAD DISCLOSURE AND
DISCLAIMER LAWS
This Note has argued that if they cannot forbid corporate electoral
advocacy, legislators should turn their attention to regulating it through more
extensive disclosure and disclaimer provisions. This Part examines the
constitutional dimensions of such a move. Section A describes two lines of
jurisprudence that govern this field. One, rooted in Buckley, confines
expenditure regulations to the domain of express advocacy. Another, developed
most fully in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,127 recognizes the
constitutional value of anonymity. Section B sketches the components of a
broader regulatory scheme, with attention to policy choices that would raise
greater or lesser constitutional concerns under current doctrine. Sections C and
D explain why neither Buckley and its progeny nor the line of right-to-
anonymity cases should forbid expansive disclosure and disclaimer regulations
for corporate electoral advocacy.
A. The Existing Jurisprudence
This Section surveys two lines of doctrine that govern restrictions on
electoral advocacy by individuals. Sections C and D will argue that the
assumptions underlying these doctrines do not extend to corporate speech.
127. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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1. Buckley and Express Advocacy
The limitation of expenditure regulations to the zone of express advocacy
began with Buckley. Before reaching the question whether the government's
anticorruption interest could sustain expenditure limits under the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA), the Buckley Court examined FECA § 6o8(e)(1)
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Although "[t] he key operative language
of th[at] provision limit[ed] 'any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified
candidate,"' the Court found "no definition clarifying what expenditures are
'relative to' a candidate.""' It concluded "that in order to preserve the
provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, § 6o8(e)(i) must be
construed to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal
office."' Later in its opinion, the Court applied similar reasoning to the
disclosure rule of FECA § 434(e).o0
These acts of statutory construction were closely related to the Court's
constitutional analysis, which sought to protect "the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues"13' and "the ability of independent associations
and candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political
expression.""3 These principles dictated the Court's decision to uphold FECA's
contribution limits while striking down its expenditure limits, which it found
to "impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of
political expression and association than [did] its limitations on financial
contributions."" And the same principles dictated the Court's conclusion that
§§ 6o8(e)(i) and 434(e) were unconstitutionally vague because they could be
read to "encompass[] both issue discussion and advocacy of a political
128. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976) (per curiam) (alterations in original).
129. Id. at 44. The Court held this section unconstitutional. Id. at 45.
13o. Finding ambiguity in the provision's coverage of contributions and expenditures "'for the
purpose of ... influencing' the nomination or election of candidates for federal office," id. at
77 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (Supp. IV 1975); see id. § 4 3 1(f)), the
Court extended the express advocacy construction, see id. at 8o ("To insure that the reach of
§ 434(e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe 'expenditure' for purposes of that section
in the same way we construed the terms of § 608(e)-to reach only funds used for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate." (footnote omitted)). The Court ultimately upheld this section. Id. at 61.
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
132. Id. at 22.
133. Id. at 23.
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result."1 4 The "express advocacy" formulation thus arises from the idea that
the regulation of a broader domain of political speech could chill protected
forms of political expression, rather than only those forms of speech that pose a
sufficient risk of corruption.'35
The McConnell Court extended the realm of constitutionally permissible
regulation from express advocacy to "the functional equivalent of express
advocacy," holding that "[t]he justifications for the regulation of express
advocacy apply equally to ads aired during" the limited windows for
electioneering communications "if the ads are intended to influence the voters'
decisions and have that effect.""' But the Court acknowledged "that the
interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the
regulation of genuine issue ads.""' And after only a few years, the Court indeed
narrowed its construction of the "functional equivalent" term in response to an
as-applied challenge, holding "that an ad is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.""' This line of doctrine,
in short, limits the regulation of electoral communications to direct advocacy
for or against candidates.
2. McIntyre and the Right to Anonymity
As Jonathan Turley has written, "[T]he right to anonymity is a subject that
the Supreme Court has treated with almost coquettish regard, neither formally
establishing the right nor allowing its abrogation."' 9 Anonymous political
speech has long influenced- often contentiously- the relationship between
individuals and governments.14o A series of early cases in the Supreme Court
134. Id. at 79.
135. The theoretical basis of the Court's solicitude for the "freedom to discuss candidates and
issues" will be critical to Section III.C's discussion of whether the "express advocacy"
limitation applies to electoral speech by corporations as well as individuals. See infra text
accompanying notes 199-204.
136. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 2o6 (2003).
137. Id. at 206 n.88.
138. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007).
139. Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, 2001-
2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 61 (2002).
140. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE
L.J. 1084, 1084-88 (1961) [hereinafter Right to Anonymity]. That note presents an exhaustive




generally tolerated limits on the right to anonymity.14' That trend began to ebb
in 1945, when the Court in Thomas v. Collins42 struck down a Texas statute
requiring that union organizers disclose their identity to the state.' A dozen
years later, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire'" and Watkins v. United States,' the
Court invalidated laws that would have required the disclosure of members of
the Progressive and Communist parties.14 And by the late 195os-when it was
not Communists but civil rights activists who found themselves in need of
protection-the Court's determination to protect anonymity as an instrument
of free association was clear. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson'4 ' and Bates
v. City ofLittle Rock,' 4 the Court prevented states from compelling individuals
to disclose their associations with the NAACP, as either members (Patterson) or
contributors (Bates).'49 These cases reflect the Court's view that the danger of
reprisal may justify anonymity as a means to prevent the chilling of
controversial speech.'
141. See id. at 1088-93.
142. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
143. See Right to Anonymity, supra note 140, at 1093-94.
144. 354 U.S. 234 (1957)-
145. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
146. See Right to Anonymity, supra note 140, at 1098-99. This theme of protection for dissident
outsiders continues throughout the line of case law. See id. at 1o ("A comparison of the
reason given by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan for concurring in Sweezy with the position
taken by them in Barenblatt [v. United States, 360 U.S. 1o9 (1959),] seems to indicate that to
them the critical factor in determining whether an investigative committee may compel
disclosure of the names of members of an association is the extent to which the group in
question has been linked with the Communist Party.").
147. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
148. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
149. See Right to Anonymity, supra note 140, at 1101-02.
i5o. In Patterson, for instance, the Court found "an uncontroverted showing that on past
occasions revelation of the identity of [the NAACP's] rank-and-file members has exposed
these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and
other manifestations of public hostility." 357 U.S. at 462. In light of that history, the Court
found it "apparent that compelled disclosure of [the NAACP's] Alabama membership is
likely to affect adversely the ability of [the NAACP] and its members to pursue their
collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate." 357 U.S.
at 462-63; see also Bates, 361 U.S. at 523 ("On this record it sufficiently appears that
compulsory disclosure of the membership lists of the local branches of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People would work a significant interference
with the freedom of association of their members.").
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The next major case in this line, Talley v. California,"' directly tested the
validity of a disclaimer regulation-an ordinance that barred the circulation of
handbills unless they bore "'the name and address of . . . [t]he person who
printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same [and] . . . [t]he person
who caused the same to be distributed."'.. Acknowledging the "important
role" played by anonymous publications "in the progress of mankind,"' the
Court extended Patterson and Bates beyond the civil rights context: "The reason
for those holdings was that identification and fear of reprisal might deter
perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. This broad ...
ordinance is subject to the same infirmity." 54
Buckley applied this line of cases to FECA's disclosure requirement.
Although the Court "recognized that . . . compelled disclosure can always
conceivably chill association or speech," it found that "the First Amendment
provides even greater protection for anonymity when a group or individual
demonstrates a 'reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will
subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties."'" The Court therefore formulated the "exacting"
requirement "that there be a 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation'
between the governmental interest [supporting a regulation] and the
information required to be disclosed.""' Identifying three strong governmental
interests against anonymity -informing the electorate, preventing corruption,
and enforcing other regulations"'- it held "that, except in instances of
probable reprisal, the federal government's specific disclosure interests in
FECA outweighed the inherent right to anonymity.
151. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
152. 362 U.S. at 61 (quoting the Los Angeles ordinance in question).
153. Id. at 64; see id. at 64-65.
154. Id. at 65.
155. Malcolm A. Heinicke, Note, A Political Reformer's Guide to McIntyre and Source Disclosure
Laws for Political Advertising, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Summer 1997, at 133, 136 (alteration in
original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam)).
156. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 546 (1963), and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 ( 960)).
157. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68; see also Heinicke, supra note 155, at 136-37 (discussing the
governmental interests identified in Buckley).
158. Heinicke, supra note 155, at 136 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68-74). The Court observed such
an "instance[] of probable reprisal" a few Terms later, finding an Ohio disclosure law
unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74




The Buckley Court left open the question whether any one of the three
governmental interests identified there would suffice to sustain a disclosure or
disclaimer regulation independently of the others, or with stronger
countervailing privacy concerns. The Court confronted some of these open
questions in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, which concerned a
prototypical example of speech devoid of corruption or enforcement concerns:
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons
attending a public meeting at the Blendon Middle School in
Westerville, Ohio. At this meeting, the superintendent of schools
planned to discuss an imminent referendum on a proposed school tax
levy. The leaflets expressed Mrs. McIntyre's opposition to the levy....
She had composed and printed [them] on her home computer and had
paid a professional printer to make additional copies. 6o
Mrs. McIntyre was charged with violating an Ohio law against anonymous
political publications (narrower than Talley's general ban on anonymous
handbills).161
The Court concluded that the state's "interest in providing the electorate
with relevant information" did not "justify a state requirement that a writer
make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit."I,62 It added that "in
the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the
recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the
reader's ability to evaluate the document's message.",6 3 The differing scope of
these two statements helps to explain the subsequent confusion over McIntyre's
reach. While the first is unequivocal, the second seems to condition the right to
anonymity on the facts in question: "a handbill written by a private citizen who
is not known to the recipient.",,6 4 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her concurring
159- 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
160. Id. at 337 (footnote omitted).
161. The Ohio statute prohibited the production or distribution of any "notice, placard, dodger,
advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed to
promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or
defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in any election," without identifying the
speaker's "name and residence or business address." Id. at 338 n.3 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN- § 3599.0 9 (A) (1988)).
162. Id. at 348.
163. Id. at 348-49.
164. Id. at 348; see Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Comment, Exposing the Stealth Candidate: Disclosure
Statutes After McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1211, 1224 (1996)
("[T]he Court's careful language and qualified reasoning- measuring the value of the
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opinion, while the Court found "unnecessary, overintrusive, and inconsistent
with American ideals the State's imposition of a fine on an individual leafleteer
who, within her local community, spoke her mind," it did "not thereby hold
that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to
disclose its interest by disclosing its identity."'
The Court spoke about anonymity most recently in Doe v. Reed, in which it
considered the use of Washington's Public Records Act to reveal the signers of
petitions for a referendum against same-sex civil unions.'"' Doe does little to
clarify how far the right to anonymity extends because the sort of political
activity with which it dealt fell within the state's prerogative to regulate
elections.16 7 As Justice Stevens wrote in an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, Washington's law was "not 'a regulation of pure
speech,"' and it did not "prohibit expression, nor ... require that any person
signing a petition disclose or say anything at all," or "alter the content of a
speaker's message.""' But Doe may be notable for its 8-1 margin, with only
Justice Thomas writing -as in Citizens United -to defend a broad right against
disclosure.169 Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment, asserting an
absolute mandate for disclosure regulations, suggests that he retains his
position from McIntyre as a staunch defender of the government's power to
force publicity in public affairs.o7
writer's name to the document's recipient- suggests that under different circumstances,
perhaps involving a different class of writers or recipients, the Court might find a state's
informational interest sufficient, and its disclosure statute constitutional." (footnote
omitted)).
165. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's use of the pronoun
"it" is probably not coincidental; that pronoun seems more easily to imply a corporate
speaker than an individual.
166. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). The Court has made clear that it sees a connection
between the issues in Reed and those in Citizens United. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130
S. Ct. 705, 707 (2010) (per curiam) (citing the appellant's reply brief from Citizens United in
a decision to stay the broadcast of a trial regarding California's anti-marriage-equality
referendum,). For an insightful treatment of Reed, see Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the
Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History ofAnonymous Speech, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
167. See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992)).
168. Id. at 2829-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995)).
169. Id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979-82
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2832-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see McIntyre v. Ohio




B. Outlining a Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer Standard for Corporations
This Section's purpose is to outline the relevant parameters of a broad
mandate for disclosure and disclaimer and to identify those that stand in
tension with the doctrine outlined above. Consider, as a starting point for the
discussion, a standard that would cover all (1) public communications that
(2) any corporation (3) funds and that (4) can reasonably be expected to
(5) influence an election. Rather than advocating this formulation as a matter
of policy, I use it to frame the legal analysis of a range of possible standards,
observing how legislators could adjust its parameters to account for substantive
preferences or constitutional concerns. This Section examines in order each of
the five parameters.
The first parameter concerns whether a regulation covers all corporate
speech or only public speech. Corporations may communicate their political
preferences internally to employees, directors, and shareholders,' 7' and these
groups may be quite large.'7 2 But if the government were to regulate those
internal communications, it would raise more serious First Amendment
concerns than by regulating public communications, because the government's
interests in the area of internal corporate speech are less compelling. The same
is true for private external communications, such as when corporations
(through trade associations) share information as to the effect of political
trends on prospective agency action.
A second parameter concerns whether a regulation covers all corporations"'
or exempts ideological nonprofits under the MCFL standard. 74 To qualify for
MCFL treatment, a corporation must be "formed for the express purpose of
promoting political ideas" rather than to "engage in business activities," must
"ha[ve] no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its
171. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in the Post-
Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2010),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/887.pdf.
172. Wal-Mart, for instance, employs over 1.4 million people in its U.S. locations-more than the
population of eleven states. WALMART, CORPORATE FACTS: WALMART BY THE NUMBERS 1
(2010), available at http://www.walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf; see National and
State Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, http://www.census.gov/ popest/states/
NST-ann-est.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
173. I set aside the question of labor unions, which were likely the other beneficiaries of the
Citizens United decision. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A Few Open, or Not So Open,
Questions, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2oo/os/
analysis-a-few-open-or-not-so-open-questions/. Unions differ from corporations in enough
ways that they lic beyond the scope of my analysis.
174. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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assets or earnings," must not have been "established by a business corporation
or a labor union," and must not "accept contributions from such entities.""'
Although the main benefit of MCFL treatment for qualifying corporations is
the ability to spend their own treasury funds on electoral advocacy'-6 no
longer a unique advantage -such corporations still can claim at least partial
exemption from the anticorruption and shareholder protection concerns that
create the need to regulate electoral advocacy by for-profit corporations.
Legislators could include an MCFL exemption for reasons of policy or
constitutional avoidance.'77 But few ideological nonprofits are likely to feel
burdened by a requirement that they conduct their political activity in the
open-after all, such organizations exist to engage in public affairs. And insofar
as they do want to wield power covertly, they are not immune from corruption
concerns. Their motives may be ideological rather than pecuniary, but if they
seek to influence the political sphere, they are no more entitled to use the
corporate veil as a shield from political accountability than are their for-profit
counterparts.
A third parameter concerns whether a regulation covers communications
funded by corporations or only those "spoken" by corporations in the most
immediate sense. Legislators interested in broad coverage will likely favor the
former option. If a regulation covers only the immediate transmitters of
electoral advocacy, then corporations will inevitably create and fund other shell
organizations to speak for them or aggregate their speech so that no one
speaker can be identified.1"5 A reasonable standard might require disclosure
and disclaimer of the ultimate source of corporate funding for electoral
advocacy, beyond some de minimis threshold. If Walmart were to fund ten
percent of a Chamber of Commerce ad, for example, such a standard would
require that the ad carry the Walmart name. The same would be true if
Walmart were to pay some little-known affiliate to run the ad. Various
regulatory schemes already implement some version of this standard."'7
175. Id. at 264.
176. See id. at 263-64 (holding 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982) unconstitutional as applied to
Massachusetts Citizens for Life).
177. The DISCLOSE Act would have excluded 501(c) (3) organizations and a number of others.
H.R. 5175, iith Cong. § 212 (2010).
178. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 107.
179. The State of Washington offers a useful model, requiring disclaimer for the five largest
contributors to the funding of an ad sponsored by a political committee. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.510(2) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation). California requires the
disclosure of contributions to multipurpose organizations (such as the Chamber of
Commerce) so long as "the donor knows or has reason to know that the payment, or funds
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A fourth parameter concerns whether a regulation is enforced objectively or
subjectively. An objective rule would cover communications reasonably
calculated to achieve some political effect- communications that could
reasonably be construed as an attempt to achieve that effect-whereas a
subjective rule would cover only communications actually intended to achieve
the effect. An objective standard is not only more administrable but also
preferable as a matter of policy. Whether a corporation subjectively means to
influence an electoral outcome, rather than merely to air its opinions on public
issues, seems irrelevant to the potential that its speech will corrupt politicians,
misinform voters, or harm shareholders. And an objective standard would help
to forestall efforts to circumvent the requirements. Any corporation can invent
an innocuous motive for its political speech, and allowing corporations to do so
without regard for the objective reasonableness of such explanations would
vitiate the regulatory scheme.
The final parameter of a regulation, and the most important, is the
definition of what political communications are covered. As I have suggested,
disclosure and disclaimer rules might apply to communications reasonably
calculated to influence an election. But one could substitute for "election" any
number of alternatives: public opinion (not tied to any election), candidate
elections but not issue elections, and so on. And one could define "influence" to
include only direct advocacy of electoral outcomes or to cover mere reference to
electoral outcomes. These are the most consequential choices in the design of
legislation and in its constitutionality.
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that the distinction between
campaign advocacy and issue advocacy 'may often dissolve in practical
application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public
issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions."'so But the
Court has sought to maintain the distinction, emphasizing in McConnell "that
the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to
the regulation of genuine issue ads.""' For that reason, legislators would court
constitutional peril by intruding in the domain of corporate speech not tied to
with which the payment will be commingled, will be used to make contributions or
expenditures." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2010). The Ninth Circuit upheld this
standard in California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007). See
Gerken Statement, supra note 67. The DISCLOSE Act would have included several similar
provisions, including a requirement that corporations include in advertising a list of the top
five funders of such communications. H.R. 5175 § 214(b)(2). And most broadly, 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(b) (2006) requires political committees to identify their donors in disclosure reports.
180. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456-57 (2007) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (per curiam)).
18. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003).
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any electoral consequence. The state has interests in regulating advocacy in
elections -whether candidate elections or issue elections 182 - that it does not
have in regulating advocacy to shape public opinion writ large.
The question, then, is where legislators constitutionally may focus their
efforts in the gray area between express candidate advocacy (which they clearly
can regulate through disclosure and disclaimer requirements) and
communications that influence public opinion in a purely nonelectoral context
(which they probably cannot). The next two Sections do not presume to
pinpoint the constitutional boundary -a predictive exercise that would be both
difficult and unproductive. Their purpose is more limited: to show that
disclosure and disclaimer requirements are constitutionally permissible across a
broader range of political communications by corporations than by individuals,
because neither the express advocacy doctrine nor the right to anonymity
extends naturally or necessarily from individuals to corporations. Legislators
and judges should be open to disclosure and disclaimer regimes that cover
political speech beyond express candidate advocacy.
C. Distinguishing Corporations from the Express Advocacy Rationale
The Buckley-McConnell-WRTL line of doctrine would, if applied to
corporate electoral communications, bar the expansion of disclosure and
disclaimer requirements beyond express advocacy.' This Section, drawing
largely on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,'14 explains why corporate
speech ought not to be accorded the same scope of freedom from regulation.
The question here is not so much whether disclosure and disclaimer
regulations are valid as applied to clearly regulable forms of speech but whether
the domain of regulable speech is larger for corporations than for individuals. If
legislatures can regulate a particular genre of speech -such as express advocacy
182. Although Austin distinguished Bellotti partly by adverting to "a vast difference between
lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to
public office on the other," Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 678
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
Justice Kennedy has more recently observed "a general recognition ... that discussions of
candidates and issues are quite often intertwined in practical terms," McConnell, 540 U.S. at
327 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Given the
heightened potential for corruption when individual candidates' interests are at stake, a
regulation that applies only to candidate elections may be more likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny than one that applies to both candidate and issue elections. This is
not to say, however, that issue elections are off-limits to regulators.
183. See supra Subsection III.A.1.




or acts with "legal effect in the electoral process""s- then courts apply
"'exacting scrutiny"' to disclosure mandates for that speech, requiring "a
'substantial relation' between the requirement and a 'sufficiently important'
governmental interest."' But whether a genre of speech can be regulated at all
is a more basic question. As Lillian BeVier writes, under Buckley, "[w]hile
independent expenditures for [express advocacy] . . . may not be limited in
amount, such spending may be subjected to disclosure requirements.
Expenditures for speech that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a candidate," by contrast, "may neither be limited in amount nor subjected
to disclosure requirements.",,8 This Section suggests that the express advocacy
line-the boundary that delimits regulable from nonregulable electoral
advocacy by individuals - should not apply to corporate electoral advocacy.
Bellotti, which extended First Amendment protection to corporations, is not
an obvious precedent for limiting this protection. But in striking down a
Massachusetts statute that barred corporations from attempting to influence a
referendum campaign, 88 the Bellotti Court spoke in carefully limited terms.
One distinction is especially important: the purpose of allowing
corporations to speak, under Bellotti's rationale, is to benefit the listeners rather
than to preserve a liberty intrinsic to the corporations themselves. Recognizing
"'practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,""' the
Bellotti Court held that the speech at issue was of "the type ... indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy," in that "its capacity for informing the public"
was not lessened by its corporate sources.' 9o The Court identified the question
before it as "not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights" but
whether Massachusetts had "abridge[d] expression that the First Amendment
185. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34
(1992)).
186. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64,
66 (1976) (per curiam)).
187. Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Constitutional
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1761, 1769 (1999). Judge Henderson's opinion in McConnell cited
this analysis in viewing the application of exacting scrutiny to BCRA's disclosure
requirements as secondary to the more basic question whether they touched pure issue
advocacy or only express candidate advocacy. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 376-77
(D.D.C. 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
188. SeeBellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68.
189. Id. at 776-77 (alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
igo. Id. at 777.
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was meant to protect.""' As Adam Winkler writes, "Commentators have thus
appropriately remarked that Bellotti rests on a First Amendment theory of
hearers' rights, rather than speakers' rights. Corporate initiative speech is
protected because it serves the listeners' ability to govern themselves." 1 2
Citizens United quoted Bellotti and echoed its rationale, finding that the
government could not prevent corporate "voices and viewpoints from reaching
the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their
interests." 93
This instrumentalist rationale stands in opposition to what Winkler calls
"constitutive conception[s] of free speech": the idea that "free speech is
essential not merely for helping sustain democratic self-governance, but
because of the intrinsic value of speech to the individual." 94 Prominent
academics and jurists have advanced this view in the context of individual
speech."' But at least one such scholar, C. Edwin Baker, has disavowed its
extension to corporate speech,196 and his is the right view.19 7 In the words of
then-Justice Rehnquist, "To ascribe to [corporations] an 'intellect' or 'mind'
for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.""'
191. Id. at 776.
192. Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 133, 196 (1998) (citing Carl E.
Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1234-35 (1986)).
193. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904, 907 (2010).
194. Winkler, supra note 192, at 198.
195. See id. at 197-98 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989); C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-
1009 (1978); Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (1990); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech
and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62
(1974)).
196. C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 646 (1982); see Winkler, supra note 192, at 198.
197. But see Redish & Wasserman, supra note 97.
198. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in
Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 397 (20o6); Tamara R. Piety, Against
Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDozo L. REv. 2583, 2646 (2oo8) ("Corporations do
not have a 'self to be actualized or affirmed. Their employees may have them. Their
shareholders may have them. But corporations themselves do not. When a corporation's
agents speak on its behalf they are not expressing themselves, they are acting as agents to




A constitutive understanding of the First Amendment was central to
Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction and to the broader
determination of individual speech rights in the electoral context. As noted
above, Buckley sought to protect "the contributor's freedom to discuss
candidates and issues"'" and "the ability of independent associations and
candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political
expression."2 oo It was this solicitude for true issue advocacy that caused the
Court to adopt the express advocacy formulation in the first place, in order to
prevent the statute's vagueness from chilling such protected speech.o' But the
"freedom to discuss candidates and issues"20 2 and to "expend resources on
political expression" 0 ' are constitutive rights of the individual speaker, not
instrumental rights that benefit listeners. Buckley and its progeny bar the
government from regulating political speech by individuals, other than express
advocacy, not because the government lacks any interest in regulating that
speech but because its constitutive value outweighs the government's interest.
The absence of constitutive value for corporate political speech, by contrast, tips
the balance of constitutional interests toward greater allowance for
regulation.20 4
The most compelling argument for a constitutive view of corporate speech is that of Martin
Redish and Howard Wasserman. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 97. Winlder rebuts
their thesis convincingly enough, see Winkler, supra note 192, at 199-201, that I need only
qualify one point. Redish and Wasserman may be right that "the corporate form performs
an important democratic function in facilitating the personal self-realization of the
individuals who have made the voluntary choice to make use of it," Redish & Wasserman,
supra note 97, at 237 (emphasis added), but this rationale is compelling only for the sort of
ideological nonprofit that the Court denoted in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238 (1986). It is tough to argue that Nike shareholders are expressing some essential
part of their identity through Nike's corporate advertisements.
199. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).
200. Id. at 22.
2o1. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
202. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
203. Id. at 22.
204. An analogy to the commercial speech doctrine may illustrate the importance of theoretical
foundations here. Robert Post has observed that the "doctrine closely tracks Meiklejohn's
analysis. The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be
constitutionally protected so as to safeguard the circulation of information." Robert Post,
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (zooo). As Post writes,
this Meiklejohnian orientation explains the Court's holding in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), that states may require certain disclosures in
advertising by attorneys: the "constitutional value" of particular kinds of speech determines
how the government may (or may not) permissibly regulate them. See Post, supra, at 26-28.
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D. Distinguishing Corporations from the Anonymity Rationale
If legislators can regulate a broader range of speech by corporations than by
individuals, as the prior Section suggests, the question remains whether
disclosure or disclaimer mandates on such speech can survive exacting
scrutiny-the requirement of "a 'substantial relation' between the disclosure
requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest."o' The
anonymity jurisprudence enters the picture as a factor in this balancing. This
Section argues that anonymity values ought not weigh against disclosure
requirements for corporate speech as they do for individual speech.
Section C's arguments against the application of the Buckley line apply to
rebut McIntyre as well, but a closer focus on the theoretical basis of the right to
anonymity brings to view more specific distinctions. This Section focuses on
two such distinctions - the less compelling nature of chilling concerns for
corporations and the inherent publicity of corporate conduct-and an
additional factor weighing against anonymity in this context: disclosure and
disclaimer are essential to protect shareholders against the waste of their assets.
i. Corporations and the Danger of Chilling
As Subsection III.A.2 explained, the fear of chilling expression by
subjecting speakers to reprisal is central to the right of anonymity. A (fittingly)
anonymous student author in this law journal, surveying the anonymity case
law through 1961, wrote that "the scope of the right is limited by its rationale-
deterrence. Unless a disclosure provision is likely to deter the expression of
ideas either because a potential advocate fears reprisals or desires to avoid
publicity, it does not infringe the constitutional right.",2o6 Neither McIntyre nor
other recent case law2 o7 has disturbed that assessment. The First Amendment
logic of anonymity is clear: a right to anonymity enables speakers to express
themselves without fear of retaliation.
The sorts of retaliation concerns that have so far animated the Supreme
Court's anonymity jurisprudence bear an unclear relation to the potential
forms of reprisal for corporate speech. Seth Kreimer identifies three genres of
205. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).
206. Right to Anonymity, supra note 140, at 1124.
207. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc.





such concerns.2o" First, "publicity by one agency can form the basis for actions
by other government entities," such that "[w]here there is a history of
governmental hostility or a plausible threat of future official retaliation, the
memories of the McCarthy era suggest protection against involuntary
disclosure of protected activities."2 o' Second, "government disclosure can
trigger concrete private actions against the object of publicity"' -actions that
may include physical violence.. or economic retaliation.m Third, "disclosure
can lay the basis for social stigma and expose to public view information the
victim wishes to remain private.""
The first mechanism is inapposite here. A particular legislator or regulator
might disfavor some corporation and even act on that disfavor. But it is one
thing to suggest that government actors wielding temporary power could
punish a corporation for its political speech. It is another to suggest that the
government as a whole would do so, as with the Communist Party or other
perceived threats to national security.
The second and third mechanisms are more plausible in the context of
corporate speech, but not much more compelling. Consider first the prospect
of "concrete private actions" -direct retaliation by individuals against a
corporation that speaks in a way they do not like. Such retaliation has been the
focus of most of the Supreme Court's anonymity jurisprudence subsequent to
the early cases dealing with official retaliation against Communism. Some form
of private retaliatory action is possible in the context of corporate speech:
consumers who do not like what a corporation says may boycott its products."
But that sort of market activity differs from what seems to have animated most
of the Supreme Court's anonymity jurisprudence: the danger of interpersonal
retaliation.
The Court has often framed its solicitude for anonymity as a way to prevent
the sort of direct, face-to-face repudiation by one's neighbors that most
severely chills individuals' speech. In Bates v. City ofLittle Rock, for instance, the
208. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34 (1991).
209. Id.; see id. at 35-39.
210. Id. at 34; see id. at 39-50.
211. Id. at 39-42.
212. Id. at 42-50.
213. Id. at 35; see id. at 51-54; see also Right to Anonymity, supra note 140, at 1io8 ("The high regard
the American people have for their privacy, suggests the possibility that its denial may deter
expression and association.").
214. See Kreimer, supra note 208, at 44-46.
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Court cited evidence from witnesses who spoke to the communal retaliation
that a person would incur by joining the NAACP. One testified that "the
people are afraid to join, afraid to join because the people-they don't want
their names exposed and they are afraid their names will be exposed and they
might lose their jobs." 2 1 McIntyre reflected similar (if less intense) concerns,
distinguishing Buckley by noting that speech through the mere expenditure of
funds is "less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill -and
as a result, . . . less likely to precipitate retaliation." 211 So did Buckley v. ACLF
and Watchtower Society v. Village of Stratton, more recent cases protecting the
anonymity of door-to-door canvassers.217 These cases have focused on the
immediate risks to individuals who stand up for unpopular views. Their
reasoning does not extend obviously or necessarily to the more attenuated form
of economic reprisal- the diminution of profits - that a corporation might face.
Similar arguments apply to the third retaliatory mechanism: "social
stigma. 2 Stigma has force only because the speaker considers herself part of a
community of other individuals whose approbation or disapprobation matters
to her.21' The associational character of the corporate form makes external
stigma less effective: as Kreimer observes, "[t]he opportunity to cluster with
like-minded members of a political minority makes the threat of majority
disapprobation less fearsome, and the knowledge of the existence of other
dissenters may be sufficient to resist the tyranny of the majority."22o
Corporations might in principle care about the opinions of fellow corporations.
But even if interfirm stigmatization did occur, it would be a different
phenomenon, with different constitutional valence, than in the interpersonal
context. The threat of stigma is, moreover, less problematic than the threat of
215. 361 U.S. 516, 522 n.6 (1960).
216. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995); see Heinicke, supra note 155, at
138. But see McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The record in this case
contains not even a hint that Mrs. McIntyre feared 'threats, harassment, or reprisals';
indeed, she placed her name on some of her fliers and meant to place it on all of them.").
217. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 15o, 167
(2002) ("The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our
consideration of the circulators' interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village,
strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the ordinance may
preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes."); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198 (1999) (citing testimony "to the
reluctance of potential circulators to face the recrimination and retaliation that bearers of
petitions on 'volatile' issues sometimes encounter").
218. Kreimer, supra note 208, at 35.
219. See id. at 51-54.
220. Id. at 53.
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concrete retaliatory action. "In approaching the prospect of stigma," Kreimer
writes, "courts must establish the degree to which particular constitutional
rights carry an immunity from public scrutiny.. 2.
None of this is to say that the potential for boycotts is irrelevant to the
constitutional protection of corporate speech. As Kreimer writes, the threat of
boycotts has historically deterred corporations from controversial behavior."2
Why, then, should the chilling of corporate speech through the threat of
boycotts be any more constitutionally legitimate than the chilling of individual
speech through the threat of violence or ostracism? The answer -or at least one
answer-comes in the next Subsection, which explains why corporations lack
the kind of dignitary privacy interests that justify the protection of individual
speech against the risk of retaliation. By entering into the marketplace as public
actors, corporations voluntarily subject their speech to public pressures in a
way that individuals do not.
2. The Public Nature of Corporate Conduct
Corporations are inherently public entities. This is true not just for publicly
owned firms but for all corporations -from closely held family businesses to
MCFL nonprofits to publicly held, for-profit multinationals -because of the
means by which any corporation comes into being: the decision by a state to
grant it the privilege of limited liability. As Justice Brandeis wrote in 1933, "The
prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this generation to act,
at times, as if the privilege of doing business in corporate form were inherent in
the citizen . . . . Throughout the greater part of our history a different view
prevailed."' Well before Brandeis's writing, the process of incorporation as a
discretionary privilege (conferred first by the English monarch, then by
Parliament, then by state legislatures) had been abolished in favor of general
incorporation statutes.2 4 But it remains true that "[w]hether the corporate
privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a matter of state policy."22 At
the most basic level, corporations are public actors because they exist only
through a publicly granted privilege.
Corporate anonymity is a contradiction in terms in a further sense as well.
Under the doctrine of corporate veil-piercing, a corporation's attempt to hide
221. Id. at 35.
222. See Kreimer, supra note 2o8, at 44.
223. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
224. See, e.g., ROBFRTW. HAMILTON &JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS 193 (ioth ed. 2007).
225. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 545 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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its identity as a corporation will jeopardize its core privilege of limited liability.
Although veil-piercing doctrine is notoriously ill-defined, ,6 its basic rationale
is that the corporate veil cannot be an instrument of "fraud or
misrepresentation," which Stephen Bainbridge identifies as one of "only two
classes of cases in which personal liability ought to be in play."2 2 7 If a
corporation tries to hide its corporate identity from the public, then it may lose
that identity entirely.
One might argue that the requirement for corporations to act publicly in
the economic marketplace does not, on its own, legitimate market pressures on
their political speech. This argument implies that corporations deserve privacy
as political actors even though they lack privacy as economic actors. But that
argument has at least two flaws.
First, the concept of privacy has historically been bound up with
personhood and the trappings of personhood. As Jonathan Turley writes, one
way in which "[p] rivacy is often perceived" is "as the security of a home from
invasion.""g People who canvass, attend NAACP meetings, or pass out leaflets
in a school parking lot are acting publicly, in a transient sense, when they do
these things. But because they are private individuals, they can retreat from
those periods of public action to the private sphere of their homes, and that
retreat insulates them from reprisal. For civil rights activists in the midcentury
South, "the security of a home from invasion" was no abstract concept. The
home is, for individuals, a physical locus of privacy-a safe harbor from public
life. The corporate equivalent to that safe harbor is unclear. Individuals
associated with a corporation may require some zone of privacy, 9 but that
does not imply a historically protected right for the corporation itself to remain
anonymous. If corporations are to have a constitutional safe harbor from public
disapproval, that safe harbor must be-like corporate personhood itself-a
legal fiction.
226. Then-Judge Cardozo once wrote that it was "enveloped in the mists of metaphor," Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926), and Stephen Bainbridge calls it
"[d]ysfunctional," Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 5o6
(2001).
227. Bainbridge, supra note 226, at 517.
228. Turley, supra note 139, at 77.
229. CEOs today may justifiably worry about picketers at their headquarters or mobs at their
front doors. See, e.g., James Barron & Russ Buettner, Scorn Trails A.I.G. Executives, Even in
Their Own Driveways, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at Ai. This is an argument against CEO
stand-by-your-ad provisions of the sort that the DISCLOSE Act would have created. See
H.R. 5175, isith Cong. § 214 (b) (2010). But such concerns, even if valid, are unmoored from
the privacy of the corporation as an entity. They pertain to individuals who are associated




Second, corporations lack the kind of dignitary interests that justify privacy
for individuals. Scott Hartman writes of "a widely shared consensus that
privacy claims are potent for the very reason that they are so tightly bound up
with what it means to be a freestanding and autonomous individual." 3 o In
other words, privacy-like free expression23' -helps to constitute individual
identity. Corporations have no constitutive interest in privacy, just as they have
no constitutive interest in speech."' We may hold them publicly to account for
their conduct in a way that would be illegitimate for individuals.
These are all negative reasons to deny corporations the right to anonymity
in political speech, but there are positive reasons, too. One is that "the
government's interest in disclosure may increase with the listener's ability to
judge a message by its source."233 In dismissing the government's interest in
forcing Mrs. McIntyre to disclose her name, the Court noted that "in the case
of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the reader's ability to
evaluate the document's message." 3 This statement "implies that the state's
disclosure interest may be greater when the reader or listener probably does
know the speaker."' Whereas "Ohio voters who did not know Ms. McIntyre
... would have gained little from knowing that she wrote the leaflets," voters
in California "better evaluated campaign ads for [pro-tobacco] Proposition 188
upon learning that the tobacco industry had sponsored these ads and the ballot
initiative itself.",,, 6 This is not to say that any speaker should lose her right to
anonymity merely because people might care what she has to say. But the
230. Scott Hartman, Comment, Privacy, Personhood, and the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7 (C) in
Context, 120 YALE L.J. 379, 392 (2010) (analyzing, with regard to the Freedom of Information
Act and other areas of law, whether corporations can sensibly be considered to have
"personal privacy" interests). Hartman also observes that Congress excluded corporations
from the reach of the Privacy Act of 1974 and that corporations cannot sue under the
common law privacy torts. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. c (1977)
("A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right of
privacy."). Although the Third Circuit has held that a corporation could invoke FOIA's
"personal privacy" exemption, AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F-3d 490 (3 d Cit. 2009), the Supreme
Court will review that decision during its 20o Term, 2010 WL 1623772 (U.S. Sept. 28,
2010).
231. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
233. Heinicke, supra note 155, at 141.
234. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49 (1995).
235. Heinicke, supra note 155, at 141.
236. Id.
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informational value of her speech is higher, and that weighs in the
constitutional balance.
3. The Right ofShareholders To Be Informed
A final reason to exclude corporations from the right to anonymous
political speech is that without disclosure and disclaimer rules, shareholder
protections are useless.3 7 The rationale of shareholder protection was not
central to Austin, but then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan pressed it at oral
argument in Citizens United,"" and it has been the subject of scholarship both
before Citizens United and after.239
The premise of this argument is that when corporations engage in political
advocacy with general treasury funds, they are spending "other people's
money"24o-shareholder equity-on speech with which shareholders may
disagree. As Adam Winkler has shown, the shareholder protection rationale,
rather than an egalitarian desire to limit the volume of corporate speech in the
political marketplace, has long been the central engine of regulation in this
domain" and is critical to explaining the Court's post-Bellotti decisions. 4
In both Bellotti and Citizens United, however, the Court gave short shrift to
concerns of shareholder protection. Bellotti observes two types of protection
that shareholders enjoy. First, shareholders may "decide, through the
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage
in debate on public issues."" Such procedures include the "power to elect the
board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's
237. The reasoning of this Subsection does not apply to closely held or non-profit corporations.
238. See Transcript of Oral Reargument at 45-46, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(No. 08-205) ("[W]hat the Court articulated in Austin was essentially a concern about
corporations using the corporate form to appropriate other people's money for expressive
purposes.").
239. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L. REv. 83 (2010); Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder
Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/823.pdf; Winkler, supra note 192; Adam
Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92
GEO. L.J. 871 (2004).
240. This nomenclature originated with a series of articles by Louis Brandeis, published two
years before his ascension to the Supreme Court. See Winkler, supra note 239, at 873 n.14
(citing Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY -AND HOWTHE BANKERS USE IT (1914)).
241. See Winkler, supra note 239.
242. See Winkler, supra note 192.




charter," and failing that, "the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge
corporate disbursements."4 Second, any shareholder may "withdraw his
investment at any time and for any reason.""s Citizens United cites the same
observations in finding "little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by
shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy.'",
There are reasons to doubt the efficacy of these remedies under any
circumstances. 4  But at the bare minimum, they require that shareholders
know when a corporation is making political expenditures. 4 If corporations
can keep their political expenditures secret, then shareholders are powerless to
protect themselves in any of the ways that Bellotti and Citizens United envision.
Legislators might in theory compel corporations to disclose expenditures only
to their shareholders, but it would be impossible to keep such disclosures
private; interested parties would simply invest in a range of corporations to
gain access to their records for this purpose. General disclosure and disclaimer
rules are therefore the most sensible means to force corporations to disclose
political expenditures to their shareholders.
One might argue that shareholders have only as much right to know about
political expenditures as they do to know about other corporate expenditures.
After all, shareholders lack the power to inquire into the routine decisions
made by corporate officers and directors - the hiring and firing of employees,
market strategy, and so forth." But such indifference to the particular nature
of political speech misses the point of both the case law and the history of
regulation.2 so Whereas shareholders have only weak rights to control the use of
their funds for ordinary corporate business, they have a stronger claim of
conscience to prevent the use of their money to support political causes with
which they disagree.' Bellotti and Citizens United took care to explain the
importance of shareholder protections, even if they did not fully recognize the
prerequisites for such protections to be effective.
244. Id. at 794-95.
245. Id. at 794 n-34.
246. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
247. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 239, at 56-58.
248. See Winkler, supra note 192, at 167-68.
249. SEC Rule 14a-8 allows corporations to exclude from proxy materials shareholder proposals
"relating to the company's ordinary business operations." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7)
(2010).
250. See Winkler, supra note 192; Winkler, supra note 239.
251. See Winkler, supra note 239, at 896-98.
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CONCLUSION
On the day when Citizens United came down, many scholars and advocates
of campaign finance reform condemned it as a "political tsunami" launched by
an "activist court.""2 2 Others doubted the extent of its practical influence."'
What is clear is that the decision fundamentally changed the terrain of
campaign finance -and as that new terrain settles from its present state of flux,
legislators have already begun to shape its features.254
This Note suggests that they set their sights on a different path, not only
reinforcing disclosure and disclaimer regulations within the previously
regulated sphere but expanding those regulations beyond direct candidate
advocacy to a broader range of corporate political speech. That approach not
only would be constitutionally legitimate; it also might turn out to be more
effective than the pre-Citizens United regime in informing the electorate,
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, and protecting
shareholders.
252. Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209/. For a survey of similar reactions, see
Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77 (2010),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/902.pdf.
253. See, e.g., Tribe Statement, supra note 67. Anecdotal evidence is beginning to emerge that
Tribe and others may be right, at least under some sort of disclosure regime; corporations
are not likely to jeopardize consumer or political goodwill by waging open political warfare.
See Leonnig, supra note 69.
254. See H.R. 5175, iiith Cong. (2010).
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